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1. Introduction 
 
With the recession leading to significant budget shortfalls, many state and local governments are 
considering increasing taxes in order to generate revenue.  While fiscal year 2009 saw a net tax 
increase of $28.6 billion across all 50 states (see Waisanen and Haggerty, 2010), state 
governments are still facing fiscal pressure due to lower tax receipts from broad-based taxes (e.g. 
sales and income taxes) and increases in recession-induced expenditures (e.g. unemployment 
insurance, expansion of Medicaid and SCHIP coverage, etc.).1  Along with contemporary fiscal 
concerns, there are more structural, long-term budgetary issues that must receive attention from 
policy makers, such as the expansion of Medicaid coverage under the federal health care reform.   
 
Given that almost all states face balanced budget amendments, the fiscal options open to states 
facing budget shortfalls are either to (1) reduce expenditures or (2) increase taxes.  Most state 
legislatures have attempted some combination of the two, increasing excise taxes on cigarettes, 
for instance, while attempting to cut spending where possible.  The State of New York, for 
example, recently increased cigarette taxes by $1.60 per pack (to $4.35) as part of an emergency 
budget measure.2  The average price of cigarettes per pack is now $9.20 in New York, with 
additional excise taxes in New York City leading to per pack prices of nearly $11. Even states 
with historically low cigarette excise tax rates have implemented tax increases, as evidenced by 
South Carolina’s recent 50 cent cigarette tax hike, which brings the per pack price to $1.00 in 
that state.3  Other states have similarly increased excise tax rates on cigarettes, with Hawaii’s tax 
increasing from $0.40 to $3.00, New Mexico’s from $0.75 to $1.66, Utah’s from $1.00 to $1.70, 
and Washington’s from $1 to $3.025 per pack.4 
 
The purpose of this report is to consider the revenue effects of increasing tax rates on cigarettes 
in West Virginia.  In doing so, we will compare tax rates across states and assess how responsive 
the tax base is to changes in cigarette tax rates.  Further, we will assess some of the potential 
public health and externality rationales for cigarette taxation.  It is also important to consider the 
policy rationale behind increasing taxes on other tobacco products in equal proportions, so as to 
reduce any substitution effects between different tobacco products. 
 
Currently, the State of West Virginia has a tax of $0.55 per pack of twenty cigarettes as well as a 
7 percent tax on the wholesale price of other tobacco products (see below).  The State collected 
$115,095,000 from excise taxes on all tobacco products (e.g. cigarettes, chewing tobacco, etc.) in 
FY 2009, accounting for 3.1 percent of the total General Revenue Fund.  It is estimated that for 
                                                 
1 While West Virginia’s FY 2009 budget saw a remaining surplus of $454,753, the FY 2010 West Virginia state 
budget is balanced with only a $11,021 ending fund balance.  Thus, it is important to consider possible sources of 
revenue for the government if expenditure reductions are not possible.   
2 Confessore, Nicholas. 2010. “Cigarette Tax Increased to Keep New York Running.” New York Times, June 21. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22budget.html?src=me  
3 Grove, Jennifer. 2010. “Palmetto State Prepares for Cigarette Tax Hike.” WMBF News, June 29.  
http://www.wmbfnews.com/Global/story.asp?S=12725412  
4 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/five-states-to-increase-cigarette-taxes-on-july-1-97337734.html 
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2010, tax revenue from this source will decline to $114,500,000.5  As stated in the West Virginia 
state budget, “Programs continuing to discourage tobacco usage will dampen the outlook for 
long-term revenue growth for this tax.”6  This implies that when estimating the revenue impact 
from increasing excise tax rates on cigarettes, it is important to consider both short run and long 
run elasticities of demand for cigarettes.   
 
Given that different tax rates across states may induce tax evasion in the forms of cross-border 
shopping or small-scale smuggling, we will also briefly consider the literature on these factors 
when devising estimates of the revenue effects of cigarette excise tax rate increases in the State 
of West Virginia.  This is instructive considering that Virginia’s current tax per pack of cigarettes 
is $0.307 and Kentucky’s tax is currently only slightly above West Virginia’s at $0.60.  If many 
citizens in bordering counties see the benefits of transporting cigarettes across the border for 
personal consumption or for friends, family members, or co-workers as exceeding the cost, then 
the tax revenue effects in these bordering counties may be mitigated as the revenues will flow to 
neighboring state governments.  We draw on the economics literature on spatial competition and 
cross-border shopping and smuggling effects to produce our revenue estimates.   
 
The Bureau of Business and Economic Research (BBER) employed a number of excise tax 
increase and behavioral response scenarios to estimate the total revenue effects of increasing the 
per pack tax on cigarettes in West Virginia.  These estimates were found using IMPLAN® input-
output modeling software and other revenue impact methodologies.  For instance, it is estimated 
that with a -0.4 price elasticity of demand and a $1.00 per pack cigarette tax rate, the state would 
receive $76,201,297 in cigarette tax revenue and $602,000 in personal income tax revenue.  With 
a price elasticity of demand of -0.9, this same $1.00 per pack cigarette tax rate would result in 
only $64,655,646 in cigarette tax revenue and $669,000 in personal income tax revenue.  The 
largest short run revenue scenario is with a -0.4 price elasticity of demand coupled with a $1.50 
tax rate on a pack of cigarettes, under which it is estimated that the State of West Virginia would 
receive $151,119,744 in cigarette tax revenue along with $1,209,000 in personal income tax 
revenue.   
 
 
  
                                                 
5 Interestingly, there does not appear to have been a significant wealth effect on demand for tobacco products due to 
the recession, as tax revenues from tobacco products actually increased between FY 2007 and FY 2008 as well as 
between FY 2008 and FY 2009.  This illustrates revenues that result from an increase in the excise tax on cigarettes 
may be less volatile in the short run (i.e. not controlling for long run behavioral responses due to changes in cigarette 
excise taxes) than a reliance on increases in the capital gains tax, the sales tax, or even the income tax.   
6 http://www.wvbudget.gov/BudDocs/VIBR2011.pdf  
7 At the state level.  Some municipalities and local governments have additional per pack taxes on cigarettes (see 
below). 
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2. Cross‐state Comparison of Cigarette Tax Rates 
 
According to Gruber, Sen, and Stabile (2003) “one of the most common sources of government 
revenue around the world is the taxation of tobacco products.”  In the United States, cigarettes 
are one of the most regularly and heavily taxed commodities.  As in previous fiscal dilemmas, 
many states are currently considering implementing additional tax rate hikes to secure funding 
for government programs and public goods and services.  In FY 2003, 18 states implemented 
cigarette tax increases to mitigate revenue losses.   Last year, 14 states, Washington, D.C., and 
the federal government increased tax rates on cigarettes (CDC, 2010; USA Today, 2010).   The 
federal government implemented a 62 cent increase in the cigarette tax on February 4, 2009, 
resulting in total federal cigarette taxes of $1.01 per pack.   
 
As shown in the figure below, state cigarette taxes per pack currently range from $0.17 per pack 
in Missouri to $4.35 per pack in New York.  Across the United States, the average cigarette tax 
per pack of cigarettes is currently $1.45.   
 
Figure 1:  Excise Tax Rates on Cigarettes Across States 
 
 
 
Most recently public available data on excise tax rates on cigarettes across states come from the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids.   
 
In West Virginia, the current tax rate on cigarettes is 0.55 per pack, which is less than the rate in 
neighboring Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and Kentucky, but more than Virginia. West 
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Virginia is one of 12 states with taxes on cigarettes at or below $0.60 per pack and ranks 43rd 
among U.S. states.  
 
Along with per pack excise tax rates on cigarettes, some states have set minimum price laws for 
cigarettes.  West Virginia and Virginia do not have such a law, but Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania do.8  As far as statewide smoking policies are concerned, Kentucky, Virginia, 
and West Virginia do not have smoke-free workplaces, smoke-free restaurants, or smoke-free 
bars.9  In contrast, Maryland and Ohio ban smoking in workplaces, restaurants, and bars.  
Pennsylvania only bans smoking in workplaces, but not in restaurants or bars.   
 
In addition to state and federal cigarette taxes, some local governments have implemented taxes 
on cigarettes and tobacco products.  For instance, Falls Church, Virginia has a cigarette tax of 
$0.75 and Alexandria, Virginia has a tax of $0.70.  Cuyahoga County in Ohio has a cigarette tax 
of $0.345.  Many localities in Virginia likewise have cigarette taxes (e.g. Hampton, Newport 
News, Norfolk, Chesapeake, Fairfax, Virginia Beach, etc.) ranging from $0.68 per pack to $0.20.  
Thus, due to these local option excise taxes, Virginia actually has higher cigarette prices in many 
localities than West Virginia.10   
 
2.1. Taxes on Other Tobacco Products 
 
Given that a cigarette tax increase may induce substitution towards other tobacco products, it is 
also important to consider differences within state and across neighboring states in tax rates on 
all other tobacco products.  As reported by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, all states aside 
from Pennsylvania have some form of tax on non-cigarette tobacco products.  In considering 
taxes in neighboring states (aside from Pennsylvania, which has no tax on other tobacco 
products), Kentucky has a 19 cent tax per unit of dry snuff (moist snuff is taxed at 15 percent of 
the wholesale price), whereas Maryland has a 15 percent tax on the wholesale price of snuff, 
Ohio has a 17 percent tax on the wholesale price of snuff, and Virginia has a tax of 10 percent of 
the manufacturer’s price.  West Virginia’s tax on snuff is the lowest of its neighbors (aside from 
Pennsylvania), with a tax of 7 percent of the wholesale price.   
 
Kentucky taxes chewing and smoking tobacco at 15 percent on the wholesale price.  Maryland 
has an identical tax, whereas Ohio has a 17 percent tax on the wholesale price and Virginia has a 
10 percent tax on the manufacturer’s price.  West Virginia’s is once again the lowest of its 
neighbors (other than Pennsylvania), with 7 percent tax on the wholesale price.  For cigars, 
Kentucky has a 15 percent tax on the wholesale price, which aligns with that of Maryland.  
Ohio’s tax is the same as on chewing and smoking tobacco products, at 17 percent of the 
wholesale price of cigars.  Pennsylvania taxes little cigars as cigarettes, though actual cigars are 
not taxed.  West Virginia has a 7 percent tax on the wholesale price of cigars.11 
                                                 
8 http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/state_data/state_highlights/2010/pdfs/highlights2010.pdf  
9 Yet in West Virginia, for instance, the implementation of smoking bans occurs under the auspices of county health 
departments.   
10 Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.  Fact Sheet: “Local Government Cigarette Tax Rates & Fees.” 
11 Source: Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, June 23, 2010.  Fact sheet: “State Excise Tax Rates for Non-Cigarette 
Tobacco Products.”  
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3. Demand and the Elasticity of Demand for 
Cigarettes 
 
As for the demand for cigarettes and tobacco products in West Virginia, the 2006-2007 National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health Findings reported that 582,000 West Virginians age 12 and over 
indicated use of tobacco products in the prior month.  Around 479,000 West Virginians in the 
same age category had used cigarettes in the prior month.12  
 
These statistics may change over time with increased taxes on tobacco products because of the 
response of the tax base to cigarette tax rate changes, however.  This fundamentally deals with 
the elasticity of demand.  In general, an elasticity estimate is a measure of the percent change in 
consumption of a particular commodity (or good) given a one percent change in the price of the 
same commodity (holding all other factors constant).  A cross-price elasticity of demand 
estimate takes into account how much the consumption of a particular commodity changes (in 
percentage terms) when the price of a related commodity increases (i.e. the effects on the 
demand for snuff when the tax rate on cigarettes increases by one percent).  
 
If a good has a high elasticity of demand, then demand for the product decreases quickly as the 
price goes up.  For inelastic goods (those with low elasticities), demand only changes slowly 
with increases in price.  If one does not account for changes in demand when estimating 
revenues from a tax increase, the estimates are likely to be overstated, although the bias is greater 
for goods with high elasticities.     
 
Since excise taxes increase the per pack price of cigarettes in a nearly proportional amount, 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the economics literature are a good 
approximation of the tax effects on demand.13   
 
3.1. Estimates 
 
Economists have produced many estimates of elasticities of demand for a variety of taxable 
commodities, including alcohol, tobacco, and food.  In relation to other commodities, cigarettes 
are often cited as a classic example of a good with a very inelastic demand, mostly because 
cigarettes are a highly addictive commodity.  When the demand for a commodity is inelastic, 
increasing taxes on the commodity usually does not result in as much market distortion as taxing 
other commodities.  For instance, if cigarettes were very elastic, then an increase in the tax 
would drive many individuals away from smoking cigarettes, resulting in drastic changes in the 
market for tobacco.   
 
                                                 
12 Data are from the 2006-2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, administered by SAMHSA OAS.  
Available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k7State/WestVirginia.htm 
13 Keeler et al. (1996) estimate the `pass-through’ of taxes to prices is 1.11, in that a 10 percent increase in taxes 
would lead to around an 11 percent increase in the retail price of cigarettes.   
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In the economics literature, the ‘consensus’ estimate of the elasticity of demand for cigarettes is 
around -0.4 (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Gruber, Sen, and Stabile, 2003), which implies that a 
10 percent increase in the tax rate on cigarettes is, on average, associated with a 4 percent 
reduction in cigarette consumption.  This implies that as a commodity, cigarettes are quite 
inelastic.  However, as we shall see below, when we take into account demographic and 
economic variables, this estimate can change substantially. 
 
3.2. Demographic Differences 
 
While this -0.4 measure is defined as the ‘consensus’ estimate, there are many other factors to 
take into consideration when assessing the elasticity of demand for cigarettes, such as age, 
education, income, and gender.  Economists and public health experts have suggested that the 
elasticity of demand for cigarettes varies depending on these (and other) demographic and 
economic factors, thus the actual elasticity of demand may differ from the ‘consensus’ estimate 
for a number of reasons.   For instance, the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids reports an elasticity 
of -0.7 for youth smoking, -0.2 for adults, and -0.4 overall. 
 
Farrelly et al. (2001) find that the elasticity of demand for cigarettes for men is, in absolute 
value, less than that of women (-0.21 and -0.32, respectively).  With income below the median, 
the elasticity is -0.43, and with income above the median, the elasticity is -0.10 (in other words, 
as income rises, the elasticity of demand for cigarettes falls).  Farrelly et al. (2001) also find that 
relatively younger individuals have relatively higher elasticities (e.g. Age 18-24 is -0.55 and Age 
40 and older is -0.08).  This implies that increasing the excise tax on tobacco products may 
curtail tobacco consumption among young consumers, as they are more price sensitive relative to 
older individuals (CDC, 2010).  Since 12.6 percent of youth ages 12-17 in West Virginia smoke 
cigarettes—which implies that West Virginia ranks 45th among all states for youth smoking 
behavior—increasing the per pack tax on cigarettes can help mitigate the prevalence of youth 
smoking in the state, particularly because young individuals  are more likely to smoke less the 
higher the price of cigarettes.  About 41 percent of adults age 18-24 in West Virginia currently 
smoke cigarettes.   
 
Although a -0.4 elasticity is the best approximation for revenue estimates, the empirical findings 
on this topic are mixed.  Sloan and Trogdon (2004) used data from the CDC’s Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and found that adults age 18-20 change their consumption 
patterns in the face of price changes, though the researchers found no effect for adults age 21-24.  
Carpenter and Cook (2008) also found that price increases, in the form of taxes, were associated 
with lower youth smoking rates. Conversely, DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios. (2002) found no 
association between youth smoking behavior and state taxes on cigarettes after accounting for 
other differences across states.  DeCicca, Kenkel, Mathios, Shin, and Lim (2008) found that the 
price of cigarettes doesn’t have an effect on youth smoking participation once anti-smoking 
sentiment is used as a control variable.  Yet they also find that youth and young adult smokers 
have cigarette demands that are price responsive.  DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2008) suggest 
that adult smokers may be more price responsive than relatively younger smokers.    
 
In sum, elasticity estimates can vary when conditioning on a variety of demographic and 
economic variables.   Thus, although we use the consensus estimate of -0.4 as in our baseline 
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revenue estimations, we consider a range of elasticity estimates so as to allow for West 
Virginia’s demographics and economic context.   
 
3.3. Short Run and Long Run Elasticities  
 
How does cigarette addiction affect elasticity estimates?  One would assume that if individuals 
were addicted to a substance, their consumption would not be significantly influenced by price 
effects. Yet in the long run, individuals may choose to quit smoking or using tobacco products 
because of price changes or other regulatory or social effects, resulting in lower tax revenues 
over time.  When looking at both short run and long run effects, Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 
(1994) find the same short run response (elasticity of about -0.4) but a much greater reduction 
(about -0.8) in the long run.   
 
An additional issue to consider is how a change in cigarette taxes affects the use of other tobacco 
products.  An analysis of the cross-price effects takes into account the changes in demand for one 
commodity given changes in the price of another commodity.14  If the per pack price of 
cigarettes increases as a result of an increase in the excise tax, individuals may substitute toward 
other tobacco products (e.g. chewing tobacco or rolling their own cigarettes out of loose tobacco) 
or other commodities (e.g. alcohol, food products, etc.).  This is particularly important to 
consider in West Virginia, as the state has the highest rate of smokeless tobacco use by high 
school males.15   
 
If West Virginia considers increasing excise tax rates on cigarettes, tax economists would 
generally recommend similar increases in taxes on other tobacco products.  This principle was 
put in practice with New York’s recent excise tax increase on cigarettes.  Along with a $1.60 per 
pack increase in the excise tax rate on cigarettes, the tax on smokeless tobacco products 
increased from $0.96 to $2 an ounce.  The wholesale tax on cigars and other tobacco products 
increased from 46 percent to 75 percent.16   
 
As illustrated above, the tax rate for all non-cigarette tobacco products is 7 percent of the value 
of the product in West Virginia.  Since the average manufacturers’ price for a pack of cigarettes 
in 2009 was $3.70 (Orzechowshi and Walker, 2009), this implies that the current excise tax rate 
of $0.55 in West Virginia is equivalent to a 15 percent wholesale tax on cigarettes.  This 
illustrates why the tax rate on other tobacco products would need to be raised in proportion to the 
tax per pack of cigarettes to prevent individuals from simply substituting towards other tobacco 
products with relatively lower tax rates, particularly if one of the motivations of the tax increase 
is to reduce overall tobacco use.17 
                                                 
14 Cross price effects can also be in elasticity form;  a cross price elasticity would be a measure of the percent 
change in consumption of a particular commodity given a price change in another commodity.  For instance, if one 
wanted to look at how alcohol consumption changed given changes in tax rates for tobacco products, one would 
assess the percentage change in alcohol consumption (e.g. units of beer) given a one percent change in, say, the price 
of snuff.   
15 Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.  Fact Sheet: “State Excise Tax Rates for Non-Cigarette Tobacco Products.” 
16 Confessore, Nicholas.  2010.  “Cigarette Tax Increased to Keep New York Running.” New York Times, June 21.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22budget.html?src=me  
17 See the table in the section on revenue effects for a comparison of different cigarette excise tax rates and their 
equivalent wholesale tax rates on all other tobacco products.   
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Altogether, these analyses imply that increasing cigarette taxes may provide a short term boost to 
state revenues, but given the long run elasticity of demand, individuals will likely reduce their 
consumption of cigarettes, quit smoking altogether, or substitute toward other tobacco products.   
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4. Tax Evasion and Elasticities  
 
Individuals might try to escape higher cigarette taxes through avoidance (reduce consumption or 
shop in another state) or tax evasion (i.e. ‘black market’ activity such as smuggling).18  As 
Merriman (2010: 62) notes that, “economic theory predicts that tax avoidance will vary with the 
absolute level of taxes, tax disparities, and the cost of avoidance, such as distance to lower tax 
sources.  High taxes and tax disparities increase the incentive for organized smuggling, tax 
evasion at the point of sale, and cross-border shopping in neighboring lower-tax areas.”  Between 
1985 to 2001, it is estimated that about 9.6 percent of cigarettes were bought by individuals who 
did not pay state taxes (Stehr, 2005). However, studies that control for possible cross-border 
`smuggling' also produce elasticity estimates of about -0.4 (see, for instance, Gruber, Sen, and 
Stabile, 2003).  
 
While the elasticity of demand for cigarettes appears similar, there will be some degree of tax 
avoidance and/or evasion that takes place after increasing the excise tax rate on cigarettes.  
Beatty, Larsen, and Sommervoll (2009) find that tax differentials near borders drive significant 
tax avoidance behavior that must be considered when formulating revenue forecasts of the 
effects of increasing excise tax rates on cigarettes.19  Tosun and Skidmore (2007) present 
evidence that differential food sales taxes across states lead to cross-border purchases.   
 
In order for state revenue forecasts to be accurate, forecasters must control for the possibility of 
cross-border shopping or smuggling.  Ex ante, it is difficult to estimate the magnitude to which 
individuals engage in such behaviors.  For instance, Maryland’s government had projected 
higher revenues from a doubling of the cigarette tax than were actualized ex post.  State officials 
attributed this shortfall in tobacco tax revenues to cross-border shopping. 20 
 
With cigarette and tobacco product smuggling, states must decide whether to spend money to 
detect and prevent these activities.  This has important implications for revenue estimates, as 
increases in tax rates on cigarettes may entail downstream costs of smuggling enforcement.  For 
instance, California recently adopted the use of radio frequency tags to control for cigarette 
trafficking.21  When individuals are arrested for cigarette tax evasion, there are court and 
prosecution expenses that must be covered by the state.  Indeed, the revenue effects of smuggling 
can be enormous.  New York state revenue officials have estimated that smuggling led to $220 
million in lost revenue in 2008.22  In New York City, it is estimated that the magnitude of 
revenue loss was around $1 billion per year.23 
 
                                                 
18 Cross-border shopping is sometimes referred to as ‘gray market’ activity, since it is technically legal (i.e. it is not 
‘black market’ in the sense of felonious interstate movement of cigarettes and tobacco products) but is still evasive 
from a state’s point of view. 
19 Also see Merriman (2010). 
20 Setze, Karen. 2008.  “Cigarette Tax Revenue Below Expectations.”  State Tax Notes, September 8.   
21 Johnston, David Cay. 2010.  “Behind the Cigarette Tax Evasion Crackdown.” State Tax Notes, May 24: 625-627. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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In sum, as policy makers consider changes in tax rates on cigarettes and other tobacco products, 
it is important to assess the potential effects that tax avoidance and evasion (or ‘black market’ or 
‘gray market’ activity) can induce.  Individuals will, to some degree or another, avoid or evade 
cigarette and tobacco price increases through smuggling and cross-border purchases, thus it is 
important to account for the possible bias in elasticity estimates in the revenue assessment below.  
Yet given the current estimates of the elasticity of demand for cigarettes under potential tax 
evasion, tax collections will still increase after the administration of an excise tax rate increase 
on cigarettes and other tobacco products. 
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5. Public Health, Externalities, and Incidence 
 
5.1. Public Health Concerns 
 
Along with the direct revenue effects of increasing the excise tax rate on cigarette consumption, 
there may be other economic and public health reasons for increasing excise taxes on cigarettes.  
West Virginia’s adult smoking prevalence ranks 51st among all states and the District of 
Columbia, with 26.5 percent of the adult population currently smoking cigarettes (CDC, 2010).  
The long-term harmful health effects of cigarette consumption have been well-documented in the 
medical literature, implying that many West Virginians will be susceptible to tobacco-related 
illnesses and diseases later in life.  Since West Virginia has a relatively high percentage of the 
population that smokes cigarettes, the harmful health effects are ultimately realized in an 
extremely high smoking-attributable mortality rate, with West Virginia ranking 50th among the 
states.  Additionally, given the health consequences of tobacco consumption, an increase in the 
tax on cigarettes can accomplish two goals: (1) meeting revenue requirements for government 
expenditures and (2) improving public health.   
 
Since the elasticity of demand for cigarettes is negative, increasing the excise tax rate on 
cigarettes will likely lead to reduced consumption in the short run and complete cessation for 
some individuals in the long run, which would lead to an improvement in West Virginia’s 
smoking and related illness and disease rates.   
 
5.2. Externalities 
 
It is often argued that individuals’ consumption of cigarettes generates a negative externality 
because cigarette smoke negatively affects other individuals’ health and welfare.  Since cigarette 
smoke contains more than 50 carcinogens and is associated with a range of adverse health 
outcomes, health of nonsmokers is also an important consideration for tax policy regarding 
cigarettes.  As the CDC (2010) reports, exposure to secondhand smoke is associated with 
premature deaths and smoke-related diseases in nonsmokers.  The Surgeon General in 2006 
argued that there is a 25-30 percent increase in the risk of coronary heart disease due to exposure 
to secondhand smoke (CDC, 2010).   
 
Pigou (1920) argued that in the presence of such negative effects on others, the government 
should increase the price through taxation to account for the extra costs being imposed on others.  
In other words, given the negative effects of cigarette consumption on nonsmokers, there may be 
a role for corrective taxation.  Gruber and Koszegi (2004) estimate the negative effects on 
nonsmokers to be around 40 cents per pack of cigarettes.  In other words, the negative health 
effects on nonsmokers are valued at about 40 cents for every pack of cigarettes smoked, which 
is, for the most part, far below the tax rate that is currently implemented across states.  Thus, as 
far as externalities are concerned, there does not appear to be a strong argument for higher taxes.   
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5.3. Tax Incidence  
 
Issues of tax incidence, or who ultimately bears the burden of a particular tax are also relevant to 
discussions involving a tax increase.  Since relatively low income individuals typically consume 
cigarettes more than their relatively higher income peers, any tax on cigarettes necessarily 
impacts relatively low income individuals more than the relatively well-off, illustrating the 
regressive nature of cigarette excise taxes.     
 
To lessen the burden of taxation on relatively low income individuals, state governments could 
use the tax revenues from cigarette excise taxes to help fund projects or programs that benefit 
relatively low-income individuals, but this reduces the state’s ability to use additional funds to 
offset budget deficits.24   
 
   
                                                 
24 As the authors of a CDC report (2010) argue, “One of the ways in which states can increase funding for tobacco 
control programs is by increasing the price of tobacco products through higher excise taxes, with a portion of the 
revenue dedicated to tobacco control efforts.”  This is especially important considering that West Virginia’s funding 
level for tobacco control was only 24.1 percent of what is recommended by the CDC’s Best Practices.   
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6. Revenue Effects: Impact Estimates under 
Different Cigarette Excise Tax Scenarios 
 
Tobacco tax revenue has been an important part of the total tax revenue collected by West 
Virginia, especially since FY 2003-2004, as shown in Table 1. Since the last increase in the 
cigarette tax rate, tobacco tax revenue has totaled between $100 and $115 million each year 
accounting for approximately 3% of the state’s total tax revenue.  
 
 
 
As shown in the above table, changes in tax rates can have a significant impact of the state’s tax 
revenue. A change in the cigarette tax can alter the total tax revenue for the state but the level of 
change depends on the elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the state, the price competition from 
surrounding states, and the level of rate change. In order to account for these variables, we 
consider 12 scenarios for cigarette tax rate changes and the effect these changes will have on 
cigarette sales, cigarette tax revenues and personal income tax revenues. Tax and sales estimates 
were calculated using revenue impact methodologies and the IMPLAN® input-output modeling 
system. The following assumptions were made to estimate the effects of changing the state’s 
cigarette tax rate: 
 
 Estimates were made for raising the cigarette tax rate from $0.55 per pack to $1.00, 
$1.20, $1.35, and $1.50 per pack assuming elasticity of demand of -0.4, -0.9, and -1.4.  
 Personal income tax impact was estimated through the IMPLAN® input-output modeling 
system. 
 The net impacts were found by subtracting the 4% discount given to cigarette vendors 
from the gross cigarette excise tax impact 
 
Fiscal Year
Cigarette Tax 
Revenue
Smokeless Tobacco 
Tax Revenue
Total Tobacco 
Tax Revenue
Tobacco Tax Revenue as 
a % of Total Tax Revenue
2002-2003 $32,500,000 $4,800,000 $37,300,000 1.3%
2003-2004 $97,600,000 $5,200,000 $102,800,000 3.4%
2004-2005 $96,000,000 $4,800,000 $100,800,000 3.3%
2005-2006 $95,500,000 $4,700,000 $100,200,000 3.1%
2006-2007 $103,200,000 $4,900,000 $108,100,000 3.0%
2007-2008 $106,700,000 $5,100,000 $111,800,000 2.9%
2008-2009 $107,000,000 $5,400,000 $112,400,000 2.9%
2009-2010 $114,500,000 3.0%
Note: May 1, 2003 the cigarette tax increased from $0.17 per pack to $0.55 per pack.
Note: Cigarette tax revenue and smokeless tobacco tax revenue w as reported together in 2009-2010.
Source: West Virginia State Budget Office
Table 1: Significance of Tobacco Tax Revenue to West Virginia
Fiscal Year 2003-2010
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Table 2 shows each scenario estimated for each tax rate change and elasticity of demand level. 
Notice that, as discussed above, the greater the elasticity of demand for cigarettes, the lower the 
number of cigarettes consumed and thus declines in total sales of cigarettes and total state 
revenues25.  
 
 
    
                                                 
25 Note that other state taxes are also affected by a change in the cigarette tax rate. These taxes include corporate net 
income tax, business franchise tax, and total sales tax. The impact on these taxes was not estimated in this report.   
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Price Elasticity of Demand -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -0.9
Rate Increase ($/pack) $0.45 $0.65 $0.80 $0.95 $0.45 $0.65
New Tax Rate ($/pack) $1.00 $1.20 $1.35 $1.50 $1.00 $1.20
Changes in State Taxes
Personal Income Tax $602,000 $853,000 $1,033,800 $1,209,000 $669,000 $865,000
Cigarette Tax $76,201,297 $107,400,212 $129,721,804 $151,119,744 $64,655,646 $87,387,750
Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12
Price Elasticity of Demand -0.9 -0.9 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
Rate Increase ($/pack) $0.80 $0.95 $0.45 $0.65 $0.80 $0.95
New Tax Rate ($/pack) $1.35 $1.50 $1.00 $1.20 $1.35 $1.50
Changes in State Taxes
Personal Income Tax $972,000 $1,044,000 $243,000 $194,000 $94,000 -$60,400
Cigarette Tax $102,012,242 $114,558,516 $53,109,995 $67,375,288 $74,302,679 $77,997,287
Note: State personal income tax impact calculated through IMPLAN
Table 2: Impacts of Various Cigarette Excise Tax Increase Scenarios for West Virginia
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7. Conclusion 
 
Given that many state and local governments are experiencing significant budget shortfalls due 
to the recession, an increase in tobacco taxation may be one way to increase revenue.  
In addition to contemporary fiscal concerns, there are more structural, long-term budgetary 
issues looming on the horizon.  The recently passed federal health care bill will expand Medicaid 
coverage for 16 million more Americans, adding to the fiscal burden of state-sponsored public 
health insurance.  While the federal government will cover most of the expenditures related to 
Medicaid coverage expansion, state governments will either have to increase revenues to cover 
their expenditure shares or cut eligibility for Medicaid (or particular health benefits or services) 
accordingly.  The Arizona state government, for instance, is currently considering cutting health 
insurance coverage for 320,000 childless adults and relatively higher income Medicaid enrollees 
due to budget woes.26  Further, potential climate change legislation at the federal level could 
have significant budgetary implications for West Virginia.  While increasing taxes on tobacco 
products may not be appealing to state policy makers, from a short-run and long-run revenue 
perspective, such actions may generate a sufficient level of revenue to meet fiscal requirements.   
 
In this report, we have estimated the revenue impact of increasing tobacco taxes.  Using 
IMPLAN® input-output calculations, it is estimated that additional cigarette tax revenues from a 
$0.45 tax increase range from $53 to $76 million depending on which assumption one uses to 
estimates the effects of the tax price increase on demand for cigarettes.   
 
As illustrated in this report, tobacco taxation will lead to a short run revenue increase, but given 
estimates of the long run elasticity of demand for tobacco products, in the long run states will 
need to engage in more innovative and creative tax policy solutions to fiscal crises. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
26 Adamy, Janet. 2010. “Medicaid Stalemate Tests Cash-Hungry States.” Wall Street Journal, July 13: A6.   
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